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Abstract
The blockchain comes with the promise of being a
disruptive technology with the potential for novel
ways of interaction in a wide range of applications.
Although scholarly interest in the technology is
growing, a broad analysis of blockchain applications
from a governance perspective lacks to date. This
research pays special attention to the governance of
blockchain systems and illustrates core governance
decisions on 15 blockchain systems from four
application domains. Based on academic literature,
semi-structured interviews with representatives from
those companies, and content analysis of grey
literature, different blockchain governance decisions
have been derived and their enactment described.
The identification of them enriches the scarce body of
knowledge on blockchain systems with a better
understanding of how key governance decisions are
enacted in practice.

1. Introduction
In recent years, the blockchain technology emerged
from a provider of cryptocurrencies to an alternative
fashion to maintain and share data in a collaborative
manner. All over the globe, organizations of all sorts
form consortia to explore the merits of this
technology. Those merits vary from product
innovation or optimization of inter-organizational
business processes by replacing third-partyauthentication with the algorithmic that blockchain
natively provide.
Despite all the enthusiasm, how those efforts are
governed – also beyond who is formally in charge remains an open question. The history of research on
open as well as inter-organizational collaboration is
long; despite being fundamentally different,
collaboration within both has not always been
fruitful, due to mistrust, missing say, or own interests
[1], [2] – the governance of inter-organizational
collaboration is of utmost importance as it safeguards
involved party’s interests [3]. Our research sheds
URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10125/59891
ISBN: 978-0-9981331-2-6
(CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)

Gianluca Miscione
University College Dublin
gianluca.miscione@ucd.ie

Gerhard Schwabe
University of Zurich
schwabe@ifi.uzh.ch

light on how blockchain systems are governed,
seeing governance as decision rights placement and
enactment. We thereby derive six core decisions and
illustrates their enactment on 15 cases complemented
with 18 semi-structured expert interviews with
representatives from those cases.
Little is known about what and how key decisions are
made and enforced in blockchain systems [3].
Decision-making and enactment can be conducted in
several ways as it can be seen in free-and-opensource (FOSS) projects [4] or business networks [5];
even in those, collaboration may vary greatly. There
is a plethora of governance frameworks in IT, in the
corporate realm, public administration, and many
more; a governance framework for blockchain
systems examining the generic roles, responsibilities,
decision rights, or incentives of actors in a blockchain
system is yet to be defined. This gap in literature is
motivating, not least because the number of
blockchain projects is steadily increasing.
Hence, this research answers the incumbent call for
research on how blockchain systems are governed
[6], [7]; not only to improve their well-functioning
from an organizational perspective [8], but also to
anticipate future inhibitors which may arise and the
changes they bring to various domains [9]. Therefore,
this research answers the following research
questions:
RQ1: What are major decisions about blockchain
systems?
RQ2: How are those key decisions enacted in
practice?
Section 2 provides an introduction to the research
topic and introduces the reader to the field of
governance in general as well as from a blockchain
perspective. Next, section 3 details this research’s
underlying methodology. Section 4 presents the
results of the analysis, with a narrow focus on
blockchain decisions and how they are enacted. In
section 5, the results are discussed against the
background of the works identified in section 2.
Section 6 concludes by giving an outlook for future
research venues.
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2. Related Work
2.1 Blockchain Systems

Access to Transactions

As this paper centers on governance, a technical
explanation of how blockchains work is not
considered here. However, to grasp the main
differences in decision-making processes that
blockchain brings about, it is helpful to use existing
classifications of blockchain systems and to outline
their main characteristics. A blockchain system is
hereby defined as the underlying technology
(blockchain) and its organizational embedment
(community surrounding the blockchain and its
utilization). Following the notion of Peters and
Panayi [10], a classification of blockchain systems
can be seen along the access to transactions (public or
private)
and
transaction
validation
rights
(permissioned or permissionless).
Table 1. Classification of Blockchain Types,
adapted from Peters and Panayi [10]

Public

Private

Access to Transaction Validation
Permissioned
Permissionless
All nodes can
All nodes can
read/submit
read, submit,
transactions;authorized
and validate
nodes validate
transactions.
transactions.
Only authorized nodes
can read, submit, and
N/A
validate transactions.

Blockchains proved to overcome the doublespending problem and, hence, bring rivalry to digital
settings [8]. With this characteristic of native
authentication of rightfulness [8], blockchain systems
became increasingly interesting in domains which
use to rely on third parties to provide authentication,
such as banks or notaries; a blockchain system,
hence, can provide trustworthy data: if entered data is
correct, the ledger can guarantee its immutability, at
least in prospect. This reliability is fostered through
the blockchain’s characteristics of decentralization
(no central entity), persistency (transactions cannot
be deleted), auditability (traceability of events), and
anonymity (key pairs) [11], [12]; the latter may vary
depending on the utilized type of blockchain systems.

2.2 Governance from different perspectives
The meaning of governance is tailored to its
application domain, with the most prominent being
political [13], IT [14], social sciences [15], or
industrial [16] governance. At its core, governance
describes how responsibilities and powers are aligned
among actors, who decides, how the decision-making

process is conducted, and how decision-makers are
held accountable. According to well-known works
from social sciences, governance structures can
roughly be classified into markets, hierarchies, and
networks [16], [17]. Decision-making rights and their
enactment are thereby placed either on individual
actors’ (markets, free choice), formal organization
(hierarchy, authority), or on consortia’s level
(networks, consensus). To understand the nature of
how decision-rights are allocated and enacted in
blockchain systems, the overall process of alignment,
translation, and deployment of business / community
goals into technological outcomes has to be
understood. Hence, we consider the broader notion of
the governance of IT systems; this lens is helpful to
understand the interplay between the emergence of
requirements towards a technology and the factors
that assure its successful implementation [18]. Weill
[14] defined five core decisions to be made: IT
principles (how is IT used in business), IT
architecture (technical choices), IT infrastructure
strategies (strategies for base foundation), business
application needs (specifying business needs for
development), and IT investment and prioritization
(decisions on how project approval is conducted).
The efficiency gains through decision placement has
been found to amount to more than 40% [19].

2.3 Governance of Blockchains Systems
Because of its decentralized nature, the
governance of blockchain systems may differ from
known governance archetypes, such as markets or
hierarchies. Public and permissionless blockchain
systems, such as Bitcoin or Ethereum, received
increasing attention of researchers [7], [20]–[23];
their governance can be characterized as tribal [8]. In
tribes, actors tend to organize in loosely defined
groups which are always on the brink of creating new
tribes (forks), as long as long as the overall
organization benefits from a critical mass to maintain
the system and stabilize its value (e.g., its underlying
currency). The architects of those systems, for the
initial design as well as later enhancements, are
typically core developers (e.g., [24]). Open source
principles, which are commonly adopted here and
allow users to propose changes to the system as they
see fit, can be supported by developers, but they need
to find the agreement of other core actors, especially
miners and token-owners. Having no entity formally
in charge [21], those decision-making cycles have
proven painfully complicated and ineffective, leading
to governance crises posing constant threats to the
community [9]. While the decision-making is
formally placed on the sides of miners’, users’ and
developer’s, it has to be mentioned, that prominent

Page 4536

figures (e.g., Vitalik Buterin) hold major influence on
public opinions, and hence, on system architecture
development; differently from other information
systems, however, the developers’ or public opinion
leaders’ influence can be counterbalanced by either
miners’ or users’ [3], [21].
The prospect of digital scarcity (hence
uniqueness) of data attracted interests also from
domains other than cryptocurrencies, contributing to
the increasing popularity of permissioned blockchain
systems led by consortia (e.g., Corda [25]). Interorganizational collaboration requires a consensus
among collaborating parties, which proved to be a
challenging task [1], [26], inhibited by inter alia lack
of trust amongst collaborators, own interest, or interfirm rivalry. So, governance in inter-organizational
settings provides an agreed upon playbook to ease
those issues and foster collaboration [1]–[3], [27].
By its very nature, permissioned blockchains vary
from permissionless ones in the restriction of either
validation or access rights or both [10]. Agreement
upon data validity is thereby dependent on both wellallocated write rights to write data (content) to the
ledger and an appropriate consensus algorithm to
preserve its state. Further, the notion of smart
contracts brings a form of algorithmic governance,
providing an agreed upon, deterministic sequence of
events based on input criteria [28], [29]. Same as
smart contracts, and other information systems, the
overall blockchain system is subject to change over
time [30] and thus requires a corresponding process.
Drawn from the previous arguments, it can be
seen that forms of organizing, hence the decisionmaking process, in and around blockchain systems
vary and clear responsibilities are hard to be
assigned. It remains unexplored, which decisions are
deemed central to blockchain systems and which
actors or organizations actually sit in the driver’s
seat, if there is one at all, and steer the development
of blockchain systems. This demands exploration in
the field.

3. Methodology
In the form of an exploratory study [31], [32], we
assured a wide coverage of information and (1)
derived codings based on practitioner’s view and
scientific literature (literature review, grey literature
review), (2) found a suitable sample to apply those
codings (Interviews, Code Review), and (3) utilized
internal as well as external feedback for sensemaking (data analysis and evaluation and
refinement). We detail these steps in the following.
Step 1: Literature review. This research began
with an in-depth literature review following the
methodology proposed by vom Brocke et al. [33].

The scope of the search has been set on governance
and how it translates to the blockchain realm in order
to find core decisions blockchain projects have to
conduct (RQ1). We utilized those as a lens to study
our case sample in a subsequent step. To assure a
consistent search, we first specified what is
commonly understood as governance, and which
parts we specifically address. In a next step, we
searched for literature on the main global repositories
ACM, Scopus, and Google Scholar, utilizing the
following search terms (and their variations):
‘Blockchain
governance’,
‘inter-organizational
governance’, ‘shared governance’, ‘blockchain
decision-making’, ‘decentralized governance’. To
assure an overview as comprehensive as possible on
this topic, and to include also practitioners’ views on
blockchain governance, a number of further
information sources were used as described in step 3.
All sources combined served as our basis for our
synthesis.
Step 2: Interviews. To study the enactment of
decisions in practice (RQ2), we searched for mature
blockchain systems as our empirical field, which
proved difficult because blockchain’s recent
emergence has not allowed for many well-established
systems. From a longlist of 121 companies, which we
identified through Coindesk, Crunchbase (both
widely considered the most authoritative specialized
news source), and LinkedIn, we selected 49 as we
saw the best prospect in them concerning their
organizational maturity. Then we identified and
invited representatives from those cases for
interviews. 18 of them accepted our invitation (table
2). To assure the right framing of the interview
setting and the right person to speak to, we prepared
and sent sample interview questions beforehand. The
interviews followed the notion of semi-structured
expert interviews [34], mostly conducted via Skype,
and were recorded and transcribed for coding. In
some cases, two representatives from the same
company holding different positions were
interviewed. This allowed to gain different
perspectives on the same case.
Step 3: Grey literature review. As a
complementary source of information to expert
interviews, whitepapers and documents of all sorts
regarding those cases were helpful to understand the
features of each blockchain system and its high-level
architecture. The organization’s website and press
articles (e.g., Coinbase) were also considered useful
sources of information, as they reflected opinions on
the topic and addressed issues by those companies.
Step 4: Source code and smart contracts. We
further reviewed the source code of those company’s
systems we interviewed, if publicly available.
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Table 2. Interview Sample
Date
29.05.17
31.05.17
02.06.17
20.10.17
25.10.17
26.10.17
30.10.17
31.10.17
01.11.17
03.11.17
07.11.17
10.11.17
15.11.17
17.11.17
17.11.17
20.11.17
23.11.17
23.03.18

Interview No.
I1
I2
I3
I4
I5
I6
I7
I8
I9
I10
I11
I12
I13
I14
I15
I16
I17
I18

Case No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
10
12
11
13
14
14
15

Domain
Land Registry
Land Registry
Supply Chain
Cryptocurrency
Land Registry
Cryptocurrency
Supply chain
Cryptocurrency
Supply chain
IPR
Supply chain
IPR
Cryptocurrency
Supply Chain
IPR
Land Registry
Land Registry
Cryptocurrency

The purpose of this step has been to see in how
far algorithmic governance (smart contracts) is
utilized to support governance functions and how
they are encoded. Further, this step increases the
internal validity of information obtained during
interviews as it confirms the interviewee’s reasoning.
Step 5: Data Analysis. As a first step of sensemaking, we coded obtained scientific and grey
literature, blockchain source code, and interview
transcriptions. The objective of using multiple
sources of data was to compare and cross-check the
data collected through interviews from people with
different perspectives. Each interview was
transcribed and coded. Coding dimensions were
derived by literature and centered around: 1) The
involved actors and their responsibilities, 2) the type
of blockchain in use, 3) chosen consensus
mechanism, 4) decisions taken by the actors 5), the
current phase of the project, and 6) the expected
advantages of using blockchain technology. The
results of this analysis concerned the blockchain
governance decisions as well as their enactment in
practice, as described in results.
Step 6: Evaluation and Refinement. Once our
initial results were clarified, we sought for feedback.
We thereby made our results available to coresearcher as well as practitioners working in the
blockchain realm. This phase has been conducted in
an iterative fashion until theoretical saturation was
achieved. The experts’ feedback was then considered
appropriately in the further design of this research.

4. Results
As for RQ1, a review of academic literature, grey
literature, interviews, and code analysis revealed six
core blockchain governance decisions (see table 3).

Location
Ghana
Honduras
USA
Globally
Estonia/Sweden
Globally
Switzerland
Globally
China
Globally
Belgium
Globally
Switzerland
Belgium
Globally
Georgia
Georgia
Switzerland

Maturity
PoC
PoC
Operational
Operational
Completed PoC
Operational
Conceptual
Conceptual
Conceptual
Completed PoC
PoC
Conceptual
Operational
Completed PoC
Operational
PoC
Conceptual
Completed PoC

Role of Interviewee
CEO
Project Manager
IT Employee
Team Coach
Project Lead
Project Lead
Board Member
Project Lead
CEO and Founder
Associate Director
Co-founder and CPO
Application Engineer
IT Director
Business Developer
Application Director
Security Managers
Project Manager
CEO

We describe each decision in 4.1 and relate them first
to literature and second to our cases. Section 4.2 then
details the fashion in which they are enacted,
targeting RQ2.

4.1 Blockchain Governance Decisions
Demand
Management
(DM).
Demand
Management regards who decides on how to enhance
the blockchain system when novel requirements
emerge. For example, if there are changes necessary
to the API or business architecture, who is involved
and decides on the adjustment of those (single actors
vs. consensus among many) and how the decision
would be made (ad-hoc vs. planned); actors can be
internal (e.g. users) or external actors (standardsetting bodies, regulators).
Related to Demand Management, Walport [3]
argues that in order to avoid degradation of the
technology and to serve a long lifetime, the
blockchain should be continuously updated and
enhanced. Okada et al. [35] emphasized the
importance of this decision referring to
organizational decision-making and interoperability.
Decisions on standards may also be made here,
easing challenges in interoperability as blockchains
vary in codebase and infrastructure; standards
certainly help the organization to select the most
appropriate blockchain for their businesses [36], [37].
Similarly to Weill and Ross [19], this decision refers
to “Business Application Needs” and “IT Investment
and Prioritization”; in blockchain systems, however,
the fashion in which those requirements are decided
upon (community vs. hierarchical decision) varies.
Data Authenticity (DA). Data Authenticity
regards two aspects: Data input as well as its
preservation.
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Table 3. Blockchain Decisions and Exemplary Quotes
Decision
Demand
Management

Description
who decides and how
decisions are enacted
when novel business
requirements emerge.

Data Authenticity

who writes data to the
ledger
and
who
validates transactions
and
hence
is
responsible for data
quality in the ledger.

System Architecture
Development

who decides over
requirements
and
functionalities of the
blockchain system.

Membership

granting or denying
requests to partake in
the network.

Ownership Disputes

resolving a conflict
when multiple users
claim for the same
asset
(e.g.
land
ownership document
or
intellectual
artwork).
Decision on reversing
unintended
transactions.

Transaction
Reversal

Exemplary quotes from cases
“Master node selects those projects, (…), we are using the mining rewards to fund these projects, basically, 45% of the mining
rewards goes to miners and 45% to the master nodes, and they are rewarded for providing this hardware to the network. So, in our
network, there are miners and master nodes who are receiving the rewards and 10% goes to our self-funding system treasure.” (I6)
“Right now, we are about to upgrade our network, and this is being done through a discussion between just a small handful of
developers, it’s a small network, and it's fairly easy to achieve verbal consensus for a change.” (I5)
“The (…) government is fully controlling the rules of the blockchain that can be audited by the third parties, so I think the process
will look as following: They will propose something they want to add.” (I14)
“We are talking to a number of parties to check whether in the future we can get a standardized object model for instance. So, we
contacted standard-setting organizations, (…) but it will take years before we really have a standard implementation.” (I8)
“We use Proof-of-stake, so every party that has a node has a voting power (…). Every individual node can register the data.” (I6)
“In a private blockchain, we don’t have miners but instead we have a number of entities 4 to 15 may be who sign what transactions
are allowing to the blockchain so they have a notary function and they don’t necessarily need to be one of the parties to add the
smart contract or any transactions.” (I2)
“When the artist makes the claims, people cast their opinion. Based on majority votes it is declared whether it is valid.” (I15)
“All the miners have to agree. When they agree that the block is solved and it goes in the ledger (...).” (I1, in line with I8)
“Since it’s an AG, the shareholders have the usual rights. The token holders can vote on milestones, which will unlock further (…)
tokens. It was our initiative to reform the traditional system with the blockchain solution, and we also ensured the feasibility,
requirements, features of the solution.” (I4)
If there is a bug fix or something like that (our partner) will say we would like to push this out to all 8 or 9 nodes, (which causes) a
single point of failure. Instead: Each node pulls (the code) and they should check because every node is responsible for what they
do and if we can push out.” (I5)
“(…) so, we will make the bug fixes and the decision to deploy and to determine the priority the community will take it.” (I8)
“We will have some kind of start-up groups dependent on the underlying products. I think that is practical because if we have ten
banks who form the core developers. Everybody got a different opinion so we will end up having troubles.” (I12)
“The port authority will take this role. It won't be the port authority on its own. They will form a (…) private company such that
(it) can do governance on the blockchain, that will allow people to join.” (I11)
“Right now, the (state agency) is authorizing to join this network, I think after some time back, they will announce that everything
is working good, and they will ask some other third party to decide this, but I don’t know when it will happen.” (I17)
“They have to go to real world copyright law. They will use for example such claims as additional evidence in resolving the
disputes and this means you need to the system cannot resolve the conflict by itself it has to assign it to the human layer legal
system and all of that. This claim is the additional evidence that something happened that specific domain.” (I15)
“The court system with its own private key is allowed to overwrite. Whatever so in a system of not using on chain currency it’s
more equation of making sure that everything gets notarized properly. So, if the court will revert something, they can’t edit the
blockchain what was before and what they revert it, it’s more about openness then finality on the level of the policy.” (I2)
“Once the currency is sent, its sent to that private key and there is no way to retrieve it back.” (I1)
“The user, the user is responsible for their own actions on the network, there is no corporation, there is no way for the development
team or the miners to reverse the transaction or correct any error transaction. You send the money and its gone.” (I8)
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The former regards the content written to the
ledger, either from single (e.g. land registries) or
multiple parties (e.g. Bitcoin). The latter regards
transaction validation and data preservation, steered
through a blockchain’s protocol and the use of
consensus algorithms on a transactional level [12],
[38], of which proof-of-work, and increasingly proofof-stake, are used. Both factors together, define data
quality on the ledger and have been found of
paramount importance in the literature [21], [39].
System Architecture Development (SAD). The
decision on the System Architecture Development
describes who decides over requirements and
functionalities of the initial as well as consequent
blockchain system. E.g., which technology shall be
used, or ensuring the system’s interoperability when
concatenated with other systems. This task is
delegated in some application domains to open
source developers, others are dependent on a
professional software development team.
System developers will tailor an IT solution
always to their interpretation, which causes a natural
dependency [40]. The same holds true for blockchain
systems, on which developers have major influence.
As suggested by Glaser [41], Walport [3], and Hsieh
et al. [42] the actors who develop and maintain a
blockchain’s system are key stakeholders and hold
major influence. Echoing the work of Weill and Ross
[19], this decision refers to “IT Architecture” and “IT
Infrastructure Strategies”.
Membership (M). Membership refers to granting
or denying requests to partake in the network [35].
This decision is non-existent for public and
permissionless blockchains, as there is no actor to
control permissions to participate in the system,
whereas in private and permissioned blockchains,
read and write permissions are monitored by a central
locus of decision making. For those systems, Okada
et al. [35] stresses the importance of a trusted
authority who has the power over the system and can
grant or deny permission to participate in the system.
Ownership Disputes (OD). This decision is
applicable only to applications where a wallet or
token represent a belonging to a user, such as in cases
regarding land registry or intellectual property rights.
As found in our cases, there may be disputes over the
ownership of assets, such as land property documents
or intellectual work among the users. Ownership
could thereby be falsely assigned to more than one
party or revoked too soon. In traditional systems,
courts are involved in resolving such conflicts [43],
[44]; on blockchains, however, there is a need to
identify actors who resolve conflicts when multiple
users claim for the same property.

Transaction Reversal (TR). This decision refers
to the case when the actor, intentionally or
unintentionally (e.g. hacks), performs an unintended
transaction, e.g. the transfer of assets to a wrong
account, and wishes its reversal. The corresponding
decision would reverse or correct the erroneous
transaction. In all the researched application domains,
there is no actor in charge of this decision, even
though evidence of erroneous transactions has been
found. This decision challenges the blockchain’s
dogma of immutability but has been deemed
necessary in case of major damages. The process of
reversing transactions is fierce, but possible, when a
consensus among major stakeholders within and
around a blockchain system is reached [21].

4.2 The Prospect of Blockchains for Changes
of Governance
Deriving core decisions for blockchain systems
(RQ1) served as a lens to analyze how those
decisions translate into practice (RQ2). In the
following, we illustrate their enactment on studied
cases divided by domains.
Supply Chains (SCs). Calls regarding supply
chain inefficiencies and the need for informational
and processual integration and transparency are
echoed for decades [45], [46], but often went unheard
[1], [2]. Our sample inheres four cases from the
supply chain domain, partly varying in motivation to
apply blockchain technology. C3 (platform
developer, hence not mentioned in the table) and C9,
e.g., target the product flow (Know-Your-Object) for
not only cost efficiencies but transparency along the
supply chain. C7, on the other hand, utilizes IoTsensors for good distribution practice, measuring and
guaranteeing the temperature of medical goods to
other supply chain participants.
Table 4. Decisions mapped to Supply Chain
Cases
DM

SAD
TR
OD
M
DA

Case 7
External
Consortium

Case 9
External
Consortium. State
sets standards.
Developers
Focal company in
propose,
collaboration with
consortium decides state agency
Individual
user’s Individual user’s
responsibility
responsibility
Appeal to courts
Appeal to courts
Not applicable
Not applicable
Sensor-based,
Cons.-Algorithm

Consensus
Algorithm (PoS)

Case 11
External
Consortium. State
sets standards.
Company decides,
Consortium
prioritizes
Individual user’s
responsibility
Appeal to courts
Port
authority
with companies
Contractual
(Smart Contracts)

C11, a port administration in Belgium, aims to
automatize the check-in and check-out of its
hundreds of daily customers and their containers,
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storing a unique identifier for each of them in their
blockchain system.
As it can be seen from table 4, the decision rights
for Demand Management are centralized in
consortia’s, where formal consensus among
stakeholders has to be found. This is also due the
permissioned nature of all blockchain systems. As
case 11 regards a public function, the state imposes
standards. Consortia and their (business) users exhibit
consequently power over the system’s architecture
and its further development. As for the Transaction
Reversals, all three use cases do not foresee measures
to reverse those; this may be due to the fact that none
of those cases is operational, yet. In case of
ownership disputes, all cases refer to courts. As for
the Membership, the systems of C7 and C9 plan to
become permissioned and public: users may hence
read entries, but validation is permissioned. Data
Authenticity is assured through mining on C7 and
C9, while C11 utilizes permissioned solution.
Land Registry (LR). The prospect of registering
land on a blockchain gained increasing attention in
the last years, predominantly in developing countries,
where trust in authorities tends to be weaker. Not
only third parties are tried to be replaced by
blockchains, but also the digitization of paper-based
and lengthy processes, and cost reductions are sought
for. Our sample considers four systems (C1, C2, C5,
C14), whose goals overlap but slightly differ.
Table 5. Decisions mapped to Land Registry
Cases
DM
SAD
TR
OD
M
DA

Case 1 / 2 / 14
Dictated by state agency
State
agency
and
associated actors
Appeal to courts
Appeal to courts
State Agency and affiliates
State Agency, Auditors

Case 5
Dictated by state agency
State agency
Appeal to courts
Appeal to courts
State Agency and affiliates
State Agency, Auditors

As a state function is performed, the state
maintains the control over the System Architecture
and Development as well as standards or
enhancements. Further, the state assures Data
Authenticity
through
the
ledger,
through
concatenation of different blockchains, as well as
through closer collaboration with affiliates (notaries,
banks), using auditory nodes. In case of Transaction
Reversals or conflict resolution, a user must appeal to
court. While the partaking actors in the ecosystem do
not change, users still benefit from transparency and
reliability of records.
Cryptocurrencies (C). The case of blockchainbased cryptocurrencies concerns the first application
area of blockchains overall. Cases 4, 6, as well as 8
illustrate our cases’ decision placement below (case
14 refers to a consortium and is hence not listed).

In contrast to the previous cases, the blockchainbased cryptocurrencies are mostly built on public and
permissionless ledgers, thus allowing members to
partake in System Architecture and Development (via
community discussions and votes and all the typical
processes of FOSS) as well as Data Authenticity
through mining (validating).
Table 6. Decisions mapped to
Cryptocurrency Cases
Case 4 / 15
Users
propose
DM enhancements,
developers decide
Group of core
SAD
developers
Individual user’s
TR
responsibility
OD Not applicable
Not
applicable
M
(Permissionless)
Consensus
DA
Algorithm

Case 6
Team lead and
two
software
developers
Anonymous
developers
Individual user’s
responsibility
Not applicable
Not
applicable
(Permissionless)
Consensus
Algorithm

Case 8
User
propose
enhancements,
auditors decide
Company's core
team members
Individual user’s
responsibility
Not applicable
Not applicable
(Permissionless)
Consensus
Algorithm

In all systems, there is a group of core developers
implementing the majority’s will – to their
interpretation. There are limited measures (forks),
however, if users conduct unintended transactions or
seek for support in disputes of asset ownership,
which
points
at
blockchain’s
irreversible
characteristic. The initial design of the platforms,
however, lays in the hands of its founders.
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Management.
As for intellectual property rights management, we
interviewed three experts from two companies (C10,
C13). Those projects aim to ease the management of
intellectual property rights through unique identifiers
and instant charge for usage of copyrights.
Traditionally, those processes can be considered nontransparent and bureaucratic. The cases below
illustrate the aspired blockchain system and their
decision placements.
Table 7. Decisions mapped to IPR Cases
DM
SAD
TR
OD
M
DA

Case 10
Company decides based on
community vote
Foundation,
software
provider
Individual
user’s
responsibility
Appeal to courts
Not
applicable
(Permissionless)
Community-based

Case 13
PoC: Consensus among
stakeholders
Company's core team
members
Individual
user’s
responsibility
Appeal to courts
Not applicable
Consensus Algorithm

As for the Demand Management, both systems
vary in terms of decision-making power: While case
10 emphasizes the rather open, community-based
vote, case 13 utilizes a permissioned system. Being
backed by a foundation, case 10 derived its initial
system architecture in collaboration with its users;
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case 13’s design is based on developer’s choices. As
for ownership disputes, both systems refer to actual
courts. Data Authenticity is assured through
consensus algorithms and the access to all
transactions is public.

5. Discussion

revert undesirable entries on the ledger, or exercise
further control, like excluding undesired actors. This
centralization of major decision rights, which may
hence correspond to the hierarchical idealtype [16],
raises the question if those prospected solutions
indeed overcome core problems found nowadays in
and around land registries [47], [48]; e.g., decisions
on Data Authenticity as well as on reversing
transactions would remain in the hands of the state or
state-dependent actors (notaries). The prospected
efficiency gains, however, seem highly desirable.
Reduction of discretionality. Since blockchains
are basically consensus mechanisms, ad-hoc
decisions (i.e. discretionality) are intended to be
minimized to the early stages of rules settings. Once
they are built in algorithms, human intervention ends
up being reduced, to the ideal extreme of people
remaining ‘out of the loop’. Despite this,
enhancement, membership and off-the-chain conflict
resolutions leave the door open for ad-hoc decisionmaking as it can be seen in our case sample: Conflict
resolution remains not in place or through real-life
courts, membership is either regulated through
gatekeepers or entirely open, and discussions on
Demand Management is either enacted hierarchically
(land registries), in consensus among few (supply
chains),
or
in
consensus
among
many
(cryptocurrencies). This informality stands in contrast
to the deterministic fashion in which smart contracts
function [28], which questions smart contract
adoption maturity [29]. Thus, automatic and human
decision making appears to take place side-by-side,
sometimes in competition, but algorithmic
governance is merging with, rather than substituting,
other modes of governance.

In the results section, we have distilled the major
decisions that blockchain systems have to conduct.
This answered RQ1. To answer RQ2, we have shown
how those decision rights are mapped in a variety of
cases. To complement RQ2, the fashion of their
enactment, a wider discussion follows. Considering
the matrices produced by matching the main aspects
of decision-making and the empirical domains of
application, we distilled the main points that
characterize blockchain governance and thus
influence the types of decisions to be made (RQ1) as
well as their enactment (RQ2): a) External
legitimation, b) reduction of discretionality, c)
patrolling borders, and d) temporal management.
External Legitimation. Blockchain technology
finds its origins in the rejection of external authorities
but, interestingly enough, states and other authorities
are now deploying blockchains. Even if in most cases
their control and power over these multi-party
systems is relatively limited, when they are present
their role is not marginal as it can be seen in the
rather centralized decision-making placement in
cases 1, 2, 14, and 5. Indeed, especially when the
state weights in, legitimacy is outside of the
consensus mechanisms inscribed and deployed by
blockchains. The most evident outcome of state
presence is the possibility of some sort of appeal that,
contrary to the dogma of immutability [11], allows to
Table 8. Overview on Cases and Decision Placement
Case

Domain

DM

7

SC

External Consortium

9

SC

External Consortium

11

SC

1/2/14

LR

5

LR

4/15

C

6

C

8

C

10

IPR

13

IPR

External
Consortium.
Dictated by state
agency
Dictated by state
agency
Users propose, dev.
decide
Team lead and
engineers
User propose,
auditors decide
Community votes,
company decides
PoC: Consensus
among stakeholders

SAD
Developers propose,
consortium decides
Collaboration with
state agency
Company decides,
Consortium prioritizes
State agency and
associated actors

TR
Individual user’s
responsibility
Individual user’s
responsibility
Individual user’s
responsibility

State agency

Appeal to courts

Group of core
developers
Anonymous
developers
Company's core team
members
Foundation, software
provider
Company's core team
members

Individual user’s
responsibility
Individual user’s
responsibility
Individual user’s
responsibility
Individual user’s
responsibility
Individual user’s
responsibility

Appeal to courts

OD
Appeal to
courts
Appeal to
courts
Appeal to
courts
Appeal to
courts
Appeal to
courts
Not
applicable
Not
applicable
Not
applicable
Appeal to
courts
Appeal to
courts

M

Port authority,
priv. companies
State Agency
and affiliates
State Agency
and affiliates
Not applicable
(Permissionless)
Not applicable
(Permissionless)
Not applicable
(Permissionless)

DA
Sensor-based,
Cons.-Algorithm
Consensus
Algorithm (PoS)
Contractual
(Smart Contracts)
State Agency,
Auditors
State Agency,
Auditors
Consensus
Algorithm
Consensus
Algorithm
Consensus
Algorithm

Not applicable

Community-based

Not applicable

Consensus
Algorithm

Not applicable
Not applicable
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Patrolling borders. Related to the previous, it is
remarkable how in permissioned blockchains,
patrolling the borders is an effective control
mechanism. In fact, once one is in, preset rules apply,
keeping actors out is a way to avoid undesired
behaviors. Governance issues from other cases such
as centralization of mining power, coordinated
takeovers [9], or even take-downs [20] are hereby
counterbalanced through a steering body and a
walled-up system. Unless another actors’ identity is
stolen, the blockchain avoids unwanted access [11].
Even then, the clear audit trail of a blockchain [27]
would allow to retrace misbehavior and reverse
transactions (in permissioned systems).
Using unique and verified identifiers is well
exemplified by the case of a Belgian’s port authority
(C11), where the monitoring of in- and out-flow is
automatized, reducing governance costs of oversight.
In more general terms, controlling the inflow and
outflow of any resource can be an effective
management tool.
Temporal Management. Last but not least, most
cases show some sort of temporal dimension in the
form of enhancements, access control of new
members, and reversion of transactions, which is in
line with other operational blockchains [9], [20]. As
for all information systems, the analyzed blockchain
cases were initially designed to a core group’s
interpretation [40], which might have been misled,
still placing those as key stakeholders exercising
major influence over those systems [41], [42]. All
these add human dimensions to decision making and
spread human influence over long periods of time.
This rather long-time frame could be problematic for
management because this new type of systems may
not live, at least in its current forms, as long as the
functions that it is intended to perform. This opens
the problem of future transitions to new technologies
[30], [49] and for one, it points to the formerly
introduced notion of tribal behavior [8] of users.

6. Conclusion
This research studied the governance on and
around blockchain systems through the lens of six
core decisions on blockchain systems: Decisions on
Demand Management, Data Authenticity, System
Architecture Development, Membership, Ownership
Disputes, and Transaction Reversals. Illustrating their
enactment on empirical cases guided our
understanding how power in those cases is distributed
and in which fashion (algorithmic, ad-hoc, formal).
Our results show various forms of enactment and a
new division of labor between human and
algorithmic decision-making.

Of course, this research is not free from
limitations. First and foremost, governance, implicit
or explicit, emerges in practice and over time. The
field, however, especially for permissioned
blockchain systems, can be considered in its infancy.
So, the amount of solid cases remains limited. Our
research, therefore, rather than making conclusive
statements, strives to highlight emerging problems in
an exploratory manner.
Our research not only answers the call for further
research on governance in and around blockchain
systems, but also anticipates the consequences of
those decision in practice, which may also afftect
practitioners.
In conclusion, it is worth to consider, for further
empirical research, if those systems of blockchain
end up in letting users to have more influence on
decisions, or if they are ultimately deprived of what
is automatized by consensus algorithms. One way or
the other, following what and when people put their
trust in, is a promising way to understand blockchains
in practice.
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